



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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AM: DB00012-0894

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ACTION MEA-11

INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 EUR-12 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05 H-01
INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 SP-02 SS-15
HA-05 /071 W

-----031615 080735Z /13

P 071110Z JAN 80
FM AMCONSUL PESHAWAR
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0571
INFO AMEMBASSY KABUL
AMCONSUL KARACHI
AMCONSUL LAHORE
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
USICA WASHDC

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E.O. 12065: GDS 1/7/86 (ARCHARD, D.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, PINS, XD, OR
SUBJECT: (U) PESHAWAR REACTION TO AFGHAN DEVELOPMENTS AS OF
4 JAN 80

1. (C) ENTIRE TEXT.

2. REALIZATION THAT THEY MAY SOON BE FACING RUSSIAN
SOLDIERS ACROSS DURAND LINE GIVES NORTH-WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE
(NWFP) RESIDENTS JITTERS. MOST OF THOSE WITH WHOM WE
HAVE SPOKEN CONCLUDE THAT PAKISTAN IS NEXT TARGET, AS
INEXORABLE SOVIET EXPANSION, WHICH MANY HAVE LONG PREDICTED,
CONTINUES.

3. CROSS-SECTION OF PESHAWARIS, FROM OFFICIALS TO SHOPKEEPERS,
FAULT U.S. FOR NOT DEMONSTRATING SIGNIFICANT INTEREST IN
AREA AFTER APRIL '78 COMMUNIST COUP IN KABUL. WHEN REMINDED
OF RECENT STRAINS IN U.S.-PAK RELATIONS, MANY ARE WILLING
TO BLAME ZIA REGIME FOR ALIENATING ITS FRIENDS.

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4. FRONTIERSMEN'S UNDERSTANDING OF PRESIDENT CARTER'S

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR
CLASSIFICATION
() RELEASE
() ENISE
() DENY
() DECLASSIFY IN PART
() DELETE
() Non-responsive info.
REVIEWED by *[Signature]* Date *5/21/90*
FOI-60 or PA exemption
CLASSIFY as
() DOWNGRADE TO () S or () C, OADR
TS authority to:
OADR

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AND MR. BRZEZINSKI'S ASSURANCES OF OUR SUPPORT TO PAKISTAN HAVE LED TO UPSURGE OF PRO-U.S. SENTIMENT. WE ARE REGARDED AS COMING TO THEIR AID IN TIME OF NEED. SOME PESHAWARIS HAVE BEGUN RECALLING GOOD THINGS U.S. HAS DONE IN PAST. OTHERS, HOWEVER, REMEMBER U.S. AS NOT FULFILLING ITS PAST ASSURANCES, AND THEY CIT AS EXAMPLES OUR "FAILURES" IN 1965 AND 1971..

5. THE CRITICS' VOICES, HOWEVER, HAVE BECOME RATHER MUTED IN THE FIRST DAYS OF THIS NEW SITUATION.

6. AFGHAN DISSIDENT FIGURES HERE, ON THE OTHER HAND, ARE SHARPLY CRITICAL OF BOTH PAKS AND AMERICANS. THEY FAULT GOP FOR NOT ASSISTING THEM MORE IN PAST, E.G., BY PERMITTING REBELS TO TRANSPORT ARMS OR ESTABLISH RADIO TRANSMITTERS. U.S. IS CRITICIZED FOR NOT LISTENING TO INSURGENTS' REQUESTS FOR ARMS ASSISTANCE.

7. ALSO, RECOGNIZING THEIR OWN SERIOUS LACK OF UNITY, SOME AFGHAN EXPATRIATES, INCLUDING GAILANI ADVISOR SADDAGAT, SAY WE SHOULD TAKE A HAND IN FORCING REBEL UNITY. ONE INEVITABLY IS LEFT WITH FEELING THAT EACH REBEL CRITIC WOULD LIKE US TO ORGANIZE OTHERS BEHIND HIM.

8. REBEL LEADERS' FIRST REACTIONS TO INCREASED RUSSIAN INVOLVEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN SMACKS SOMEWHAT OF BRAVADO. ALL PLEDGE TO FIGHT HARDER. SOME SAY THEIR TASK WILL BE MADE EASIER AS, IN PAST, REBELS WERE RELUCTANT TO KILL COUNTRYMEN. AGAINST RUSSIANS, RELUCTANCE WILL DISAPPEAR, THEY SAY.

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